In recent years, algorithmic pricing has become the center of multiple class-action lawsuits alleging illegal collusion among competitors. These lawsuits assert that by relying on shared pricing algorithms, companies may inadvertently coordinate their pricing in violation of antitrust laws. The article provides a framework for understanding how these algorithms can utilize competitor data in a way that engenders price-fixing, whether intentionally or not.
The article discusses specific cases, including allegations against the Cendyn Group and RealPage, revealing how their pricing systems might enable collusion in markets such as hospitality and real estate. Legal arguments emphasize that even the absence of explicit agreements may lead to tacit collusion, complicating the definition of competitive behavior. With policymakers recently introducing legislation to address algorithmic collusion, the article emphasizes the urgency for companies to implement strategies that ensure data transparency and reduce the risk of antitrust violations.
👉 Pročitaj original: MIT Sloan Management Review
